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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States Constitution specifies how treaties are to
be made, it contains no instruction on how they are to be unmade. For
nearly two centuries disputes about which branch of government has the
constitutional power to terminate treaties were not litigated. Other means
were used to cope with this hole in the Constitution. Finally, in 1979, the
United States Supreme Court was asked to address this issue in a dispute
between members of Congress and the President in Goldwater v. Carter,'
but the Court declined to resolve the issue. This Comment examines the
Goldwater case and analyzes the justiciability block upon which the Court
stumbled, concluding that a merits decision on the treaty termination
power should have been or should be reached. The merits issues of which
branch has which power also are addressed, in the contexts of both domes-
tic and international law.
II. THE FIRST CASE:
Goldwater v. Carter
After President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would
recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China
and that the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty2 with the Republic of China
1. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mer.).
2. Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-Republic of China,
6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
1
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(Taiwan) was being terminated in accordance with its terms,3 nine Sena-
tors and sixteen members of the House of Representatives 4 filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the
latter action by the President. Judge Oliver Gasch at first found the plain-
tiffs had no standing because neither the Senate nor the Congress as a
whole had asserted its claimed right to share in the treaty termination pro-
cess, and thus the plaintiffs had suffered no injury.5 Judge Gasch dismissed
the petition without prejudice. 6 Within hours, the Senate called up and
amended one of its resolutions to read: "[I]t is the sense of the Senate that
approval of the United States Senate is required to terminate any mutual
defense treaty between the United States and another nation." 7 The plain-
tiffs again approached the court and upon reconsideration Judge Gasch
allowed the suit to proceed, although the Senate never took final action on
the resolution.
8
3. Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Be-
tween the United States of America and the People's Republic of China -January
1, 1979, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2264 (Dec. 18, 1978), reprinted in
Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-
Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 931, 937 n.20 (1978).
4. The plaintiffs were Senators Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond, Carl
Curtis, Jake Gan, Orrin Hatch, Jesse A. Helms, Gordon Humphrey, James A.
McClure, and Paul Laxalt and Congressmen Robert Bauman, Steve Symms,
Larry McDonald, Robert Daniel, Jr., Bob Stump, Eldon Rudd, John Ashbrook,
George Hansen, Robert K. Doman, John H. Rousselot, Don Young, James M.
Collins, Mickey Edwards, Newt Gingrich, Dan Quayle, and Clair W. Burgener.
Congressman Kenneth B. Kramer was added as a plaintiff later. Brief for Appel-
lees at 1, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance was named with President Carter as a defendant. Petitioners' Peti-
tion for Certiorari.
5. The district court observed that several resolutions then pending in the
Senate might resolve the issue by resulting in Congressional approval of the Presi-
dent's action. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412 (D.D.C. order of June 6, 1979),
discussed in Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950, 952-53 (D.D.C.), rev'd,
617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated mem., 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
6. Id., discussed in Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.D.C.),
rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated mem., 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
7. S. Res. 15, 96th Cong., lst Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S220, S2147 (daily ed.
Jan. 18, March 7, 1979). See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated mem., 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
8. The resolution was tabled because of a failure to agree on whether it
should be applicable to the 1954 Treaty or should apply only prospectively. The
Senate parliamentarian explained that the resolution's status was that no action
had been taken on it, but that it could be recalled at any time. Goldwater v.
Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 701 n.7 (D.C. Cir.), vacated mem., 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
The amended version quoted restored the wording of the resolution before it was
sent to the Foreign Relations Committee. That Committee had rewritten the
resolution to approve presidential power to terminate a treaty on any grounds
2
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The plaintiffs alleged that the President had exceeded his constitu-
tional and statutory9 power by making the decision to terminate the treaty
without a vote of approval by either two-thirds of the Senate or a majority
of each house of Congress. 10 While conceding that the Constitution did not
explicitly require congressional or Senate participation in the process of
terminating a treaty, the plaintiffs argued by analogy to the constitutional
requirement of senatorial advice and consent in the formation of treaties"
that such participation was an implied requirement of the Constitution's
system of checks and balances. '2 The plaintiffs' specific claim was that the
recognized as legitimate by international law. S. REP. No. 96-119, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9-10 (1979). See notes 206-19 and accompanying text infra. The other
pending resolutions never received Senate consideration. See Goldwater v.
Carter, 617 F.2d at 701 n.5. Even if Senate Resolution 15 had been passed, its
character as a "sense of the Senate" resolution still might not have made it suffi-
cient to grant standing to the plaintiffs. Henkin, Litigating the President's Power
to Terminate Treaties, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 647, 650-51 (1979).
9. The Dole-Stone Amendment to the International Security Assistance
Act of 1978, § 26(b), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151 (1978), provides: "It is the sense of the
Congress that there should be prior consultation between the Congress and the
executive branch on any proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in
force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954." This amendment passed by a vote of
94-0 in the Senate and the Act was signed by President Carter September 26,
1978. See Brief for Appellees at 3, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
The Taiwan Relations Act, signed by President Carter April 10, 1979, pro-
vides:
For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States,
the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other
international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered
into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recog-
nized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1,
1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until
terminated in accordance with law.
Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 4(c), 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified at 22
U.S.C.A. § 3303(c) (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
10. Brief for Appellees at 6-7, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides: "[The President] shall have,
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, pro-
vided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... .
12. Brief for Appellees at 43-45, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). The plaintiffs also argued that article VI, referring to treaties, along
with the "Constitution and Laws," as the "supreme Law of the Land," and article
II, § 3, requiring that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted," prevent a President from acting alone to terminate a treaty just as they
prevent a President from repealing a statute. Id. at 44-45, See also Petitioners'
Petition for Certiorari at 17-21. See notes 153-205 and accompanying text infra.
3
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"Party" invested by the treaty with power of termination 3 was the United
States, not the President, 1 4 and that the United States could act constitu-
tionally in this area only if both the executive and the legislative branches
were involved. 15
Judge Gasch declared the President's action invalid 6 and imposed a
requirement that consent of either two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of
each house of Congress must be obtained before termination of the treaty
constitutionally could be accomplished. 17 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, in reviewing the case, dealt first with
two justiciability issues raised by the President. The appellate court
unanimously rejected the argument that the case presented a non-
justiciable political question.' 8 Two judges felt, however, that the plain-
tiffs had no standing under previous cases involving legislators.' 9 Never-
theless, a majority of the court of appeals reached the merits and reversed,
issuing a narrow holding that, within the facts of the case, the President
did possess the authority to terminate this treaty according to its terms. 20
In so ruling the court concluded that no constitutional provision governed
the issue, 2' that "[h]istory shows us that there are too many variables to lay
down any hard and fast constitutional rules," 22 but that the court had a
duty to confront and decide the issue.2 3 The court found persuasive the
combined import of ten factors which it did not rank, but which involved
an examination of the constitutional grant of foreign affairs powers to the
President and the role of Congress in foreign affairs, as well as an examina-
tion of specific facts pertaining to the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.24
13. Article X of the Treaty provides: "This treaty shall remain in force in-'
definitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to
the other Party." Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 2, at 437.
14. See Petitioners' Petition for Certiorari at 2-3.
15. See note 12 supra.
16. 481 F. Supp. 949, 965 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated mem., 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
17. Id.
18. 617 F.2d at 699 n.1. This issue was not briefed before the Supreme
Court, but received a plurality of votes there. See note 28 and accompanying text
infra.
19. Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote an opinion concurring in the result
which expressed this view. Judge Tamm joined the opinion. 617 F.2d at 709-16
(Wright, CJ., concurring).
20. Id. at 699.
21. Id. at 708.
22. Id. at 707.
23. Id. at 709.
24. See id. at 703-08. Judge MacKinnon filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that a majority vote by each house of Congress was required before ter-
mination of a treaty could be accomplished legally. His opinion rested primarily
on an interpretation of article VI of the Constitution, which identifies treaties as
4
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The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and, working under
apparently intense time pressure, 25 decided the case without briefing or
oral argument. The Court vacated the court of appeals opinion and
ordered dismissal of the case. 26 Beyond these rulings the Court's position is
difficult to ascertain. Four opinions were written and no law made except
that the case must be dismissed. 27
One opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens, took the view that the case pre-
sented a nonjusticiable political question, although this issue was not
raised before the Court. 28
Justice Powell flatly disagreed with this position, asserting that "we
have the responsibility to decide whether both the Executive and Legisla-
tive Branches have constitutional roles to play in termination of a
treaty."2 9 Justice Powell concluded, however, that the issue was not ripe for
judicial review because Congress had taken no formal steps to challenge
the President's action, stating that "[i]f the Congress chooses not to con-
front the President, it is not our task to do So.'130
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, expressed the view that
neither the important preliminary issues of justiciability, standing, and
ripeness, nor the validity of the President's action should be passed upon
one of the components of the supreme law of the land. Id. at 717 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring and dissenting). He is the only member of either the court of appeals
or the Supreme Court to take a position favoring the plaintiffs on the merits.
25. The district court opinion was issued October 17, 1979; the court of ap-
peals opinion November 30, 1979. The treaty termination announced by the
President was to become effective January 1, 1980. The Supreme Court's memo-
randum decision was announced December 13, 1979. Two Justices belittled the
time factor and refused to participate in the Court's hurry-up decision. See note
31 and accompanying text infra. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
(The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (also involving a serious question
about the constitutional limits of presidential power, in which the Supreme Court
reached decision and issued 130 pages of opinions within 34 days of the decision
by the district court).
26. 444 U.S. at 996.
27. Justice Marshall, whose name was not attached to any of the opinions,
concurred in the result. Id.
28. Id. at 1002-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The only reference to this
issue in plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari was made by reporting in a foot-
note that in the court of appeals the "political question" doctrine received no
votes. Petitioners' Petition for Certiorari at 9 n.7.
29. 444 U.S. at 1002 (Powell, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring). Although couched in terms of ripe-
ness rather than standing, this position closely resembles that of Chief Judge
Wright at the court of appeals level. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d at 709-16
(Wright, C.J., concurring); notes 101-12 and accompanying text infra.
168 [Vol. 46
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by the Court without oral argument and plenary consideration . 3 Accord-
ingly, these two Justices took no position at all, even on the threshold issue
of whether the matter properly could be presented in a court.
Justice Brennan alone wished to affirm the court of appeals decision,
at least insofar as it rested on the President's action being linked to his con-
stitutional "authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from,
foreign regimes." 32 Justice Brennan was therefore the only Justice who
clearly believed the merits properly could be decided without requiring
Congress to confront the President more directly.
As the Court is presently comprised, therefore, four Justices support
the proposition that the courts never may pass upon the issue of whether a
President may terminate a treaty without consulting Congress. Two Jus-
tices, Powell and Brennan, disagree with this proposition. The views of the
remaining three are unknown.3 3 The effect of this complicated voting is to
render the Court unavailable as an arbiter in any future dispute between
Congress and the President over termination of a treaty. A successful chal-
lenge to a presidential act which purports to terminate a treaty would re-
quire persuading all five Justices who are or may be willing to consider the
merits of such a challenge. If these five Justices could be persuaded to con-
sider the merits in a future case, however, success still would be unlikely for
those challenging presidential power to terminate treaties because Justice
Brennan has taken a stand on the merits of this case in favor of presidential
power to terminate this treaty, and some sympathy for this view may be in-
ferred from Justice Powell's and Justice Marshall's acquiescence in the
result of' his case. Obtaining a reasoned decision interpreting the Con-
stitution's silence in this important area will be made possible only by
reconsideration of the justiciability issue by the plurality or recomposition
of the Court.
Goldwater v. Carter raised three separate questions, each of which
related to the parameters of the power exercised by one branch of govern-
ment: whether the President alone had the power to terminate this treaty;
whether the judicial branch could entertain and decide a challenge to that
asserted power; and whether members of Congress had the power to bring
such a challenge. The Supreme Court floundered in the issue of its own
power and neither clearly identified nor answered either of the other ques-
tions.3 4 This Comment examines the various positions taken by different
31. Justice Blackmun stated, "In my view, the time factor and its impor-
tance are illusory; if the President does not have the power to terminate the
Treaty ... , the notice of intention to terminate surely has no legal effect." 444
U.S. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
32. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. These three are Justice Marshall, see note 27 supra, and Justices Black-
mun and White, see note 31 and accompanying text supra.
34. It can be argued that the merits issue of the President's power to termi-
nate the treaty received defacto resolution by the Court's action. In competition
1981] 169
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judges and Justices who passed upon the case and attempts to discover the
value of these positions should a similar case arise.3 5 It concludes that the
Court should have decided the case on the merits and that the decision
should have been in favor of presidential power to terminate the treaty.
This conclusion is reached through an analysis of domestic justiciability
doctrine and some of its individual components, as well as a review of both
domestic and international law as they affect allocation of foreign affairs
powers.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION,
AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS": THE COURT'S POWER
As litigated in the district court and both higher courts, Goldwater
presented the simple question of the meaning of the word "Party" in article
with Congress for power, the President enjoys enormous advantages, especially in
the area of foreign affairs. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CON-
STITUTION 37-38 (1972). Also, Congress historically has felt an obligation to
cooperate with the Executive in this area because of the sensitive nature of foreign
commitments. Id. at 108-09. An example of the accretion of extra-constitutional
power to the President which has been resisted unsuccessfully by Congress is his
power to conclude international agreements without the participation of Con-
gress. Id. at 173-87. The President clearly has the power to terminate these execu-
tive agreements. Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements
by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L. REV. 879, 906 (1958).
Given these facts, a victory for the President on the power of the Court question in
Goldwater, especially given the strong negative position of the plurality on that
issue, might reasonably be considered a victory for the President on the question
of presidential power. The difficulties generally presented by nonresolution of
issues brought before the Supreme Court have been commented upon extensive-
ly. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A
Comment on Principle and Expediency inJudicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1964); Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign
Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1135 (1970) (a chronological reading of these ar-
ticles provides a solid background). Even while endorsing a power in the Supreme
Court to decline the exercise of judicial review, Judge Learned Hand spoke of the
"disastrous" effect of a court's failure to achieve unanimity: "People become
aware that the answer to the controversy is uncertain, even to those best qualified,
and they feel free, unless especially docile, to ignore it if they are reasonably sure
that they will not be caught." L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).
35. Although the prospect of such a case arising again might seem remote,
given the fact that this is the first such case to be litigated in the nearly 200 years
since the Constitution was adopted, history and current trends indicate that in
fact another such case is likely to occur. The plaintiffs in Goldwater identified
some 57 treaties which have been terminated by the United States, three of which
they conceded were terminated by the President acting without congressional or
170 [Vol. 46
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X of the Mutual Defense Treaty.3 6 Reaching the merits in this case merely
meant resolving this question, guided by the Constitution. Questions of
treaty interpretation historically have been regarded as matters properly
addressed by courts in the United States,3 7 and no prior Supreme Court
case has been found which applies the "political question" doctrine to
avoid performing a task of treaty interpretation. 3 The Court, however,
has stated frequently that in performing its tasks it will give much weight to
treaty interpretations made by the political branches, especially those in-
terpretations of the Executive. 9 The Court previously had considered and
Senate involvement. Brief for Appellees at 61-64, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d
697 (1979). The defendants identified some thirteen treaties they claimed had
been terminated by the President alone. Brief for Appellants at 53-56, Goldwater
v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (1979). Professor Louis Henkin criticized this process of
counting and weighing the precedents, terming it "misleading," since many of
the precedents "antedat[e] the development of clear lines of constitutional
authority in foreign affairs." Henkin, supra note 8, at 651. Henkin also noted a
trend toward more frequent challenge in the courts of executive actions by mem-
bers of Congress. Id. at 647. This phenomenon and the difficulties such actions
encounter have been commented upon in Note, Congressional Access to the
Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1632 (1977).
Three other similar bilateral treaties contain termination clauses similar to
the one in the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. See Mutual Defense Treaty, Aug. 30,
1951, United States-Republic of the Philippines, art. VIII, 3 U.S.T. 3947,
T.I.A.S. No. 2529; Mutual Defense Treaty, Oct. 1, 1953, United States-
Republic of Korea, art. VI, 5 U.S.T. 2368, T.I.A.S. No. 3097; Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, United States-Japan, art. X, 11
U.S.T. 1633, T.I.A.S. No. 4509.
36. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 958 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d
697 (D.C. Cir. ), vacated mem., 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Petitioners' Petition for
Certiorari at 3; Brief for Appellees at 1, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). For the text of article X of the Treaty, see note 13 supra.
37. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 191-96 (1961); Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921);
Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 462-76 (1913); L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at
167.
38. In fact, it appears that the "political question" doctrine has been relied
upon as a ground for avoiding decision in only a few cases. See Henkin, Is There a
"Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); notes 75-90 and accom-
panying text infra.
39. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933) (stating that "the construction of a
treaty by the political department of the government, while not conclusive upon
courts called upon to construe it, is nevertheless of weight"); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254
U.S. 433, 442 (1921); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913). The Court has
refused to give comparable weight to executive pronouncements in other areas of
foreign affairs. In Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), the Court disregarded
the State Department's view and substituted its own judgment on issues of foreign
1981]
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decided whether particular treaties were still in force. 40 No previous case,
however, had presented a treaty interpretation question involving a con-
flict between Congress or members of Congress and the President. 4 1 Both
sides in Goldwater acknowledged that the Constitution contains no express
provision controlling the termination of treaties, 42 and both sides and the
courts treated the case as one of first impression. 43 The meaning of the
Constitution's silence on this matter, or more precisely, who may speak on
this matter given the Constitution's silence, is the issue with which the
Supreme Court struggled in Goldwater. One view, asserted in this Com-
ment, is that the Court may speak and should have spoken on this matter.
Another view, taken by the Supreme Court plurality, is that the Court is
not empowered -to interpret this silence, but that it must be filled in, if at
all, by the political processes.
The Court's failure to get beyond the preliminary issues to the merits
question identifies Goldwater as an important addition to the line of cases
in which the Court has failed or refused to decide cases brought before it.
policy when it perceived a constitutional allocation of power question. L.
HENKIN, supra note 34, at 61-62. Zschernig involved the validity of an Oregon
escheat statute which required a resident of East Germany to prove that his
claimed inheritance would not be confiscated and that United States citizens had
a reciprocal right to inherit in East Germany. Despite the State Department's
position to the contrary, the Court held that the statute was "an intrusion by the
State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the Presi-
dent and the Congress." 389 U.S. at 432. The Supreme Court's Act of State doc-
trine allows the Court to decline to decide the validity of an official act of a
foreign country within its own territory, and the Court has resisted yielding to the
Executive the decision about whether to apply the doctrine in a given case. First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Even the
dissenters in the First Nat' City Bank case said only that when the Executive took
a position against application of the Act of State doctrine, the Court should not
apply it, not that the doctrine must not be applied. See L. HENKIN, supra note
34, at 315 n.78. In both Zschernig and First Nat'l City Bank, of course, the Court
was insisting that it was the body which properly decided allocation of power
questions.
40. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190 (1961) (finding that the
1881 treaty with Serbia was still in force between the United States and Yugo-
slavia); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 469-76 (1913) (finding that the 1882 ex-
tradition treaties with Italy were still in force despite violations by Italy, the
United States having waived the right to denounce the treaties).
41. Henkin, supra note 8, at 648; Scheffer, supra note 3, at 966.
42. Petitioners' Petition for Certiorari at 9; Brief for Appellants at 16, 42,
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
43. 444 U.S. at 999 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 1003-05 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 958 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617
F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated mem., 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Petitioners' Petition for
Certiorari at 24; Brief for Appellants at 55, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
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As such, it provides more fuel for one of the most enduring American con-
stitutional debates: what is the proper scope of review by the judiciary of
acts by the political branches of government?
This debate was engendered by the very case in which the power of
judicial review was assumed by the Court, Marbury v. Madison.44 In Mar-
bury, Chief Justice John Marshall, in dicta, found that the President
lacked power to refuse to deliver a sealed commission to an officer of the
government, 45 but held unconstitutional the statute which purported to
empower the Court to issue a writ of mandamus in such a case.4" The pri-
mary significance of the case, however, was not the limits it placed on the
powers of the other branches, but the power it asserted for the Court.47
Marshall declared, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."14" Marshall limited this power, how-
ever, stating, "The province of the court is ... not to enquire how the ex-
ecutive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discre-
tion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court." 49
Since Marbury was decided, several doctrines have been developed by
the Court as limitations on the scope of its power to decide cases. 50 These
doctrines are based on both the constitutional case-controversy require-
ment5 and on prudential concerns. 52 One listing of these doctrines in-
cludes the following: advisory opinions, ripeness, mootness, collusive suits,
the "political question" doctrine, and standing. 53
During the last quarter century the debate about the scope of judicial
power has included an argument about whether the judicial review first
practiced in Marbury was itself seized in a political maneuver, albeit one
necessary to ensure the survival of the system established by the Constitu-
tion, or was constitutionally impelled. Judge Learned Hand took the
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Before this case established that the Court
could measure the acts of the other branches of government against the Constitu-
tion, whether the Court had any such power was the subject of debate. See L.
HAND, supra note 34, at 6.
45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162.
46. Id. at 176.
47. Alexander Bickel credited Marbury with making the United States
Supreme Court "the most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever
known." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1 (1962).
48. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
49. Id. at 170.
50. See generally A. BICKEL, supra note 47, at 111-98; L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-7 to -41 (1978).
51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c. 1 provides: "The judicial Power shall ex-
tend to all Cases, . . . to Controversies .... "
52. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 50, §§ 3-7 to -8.
53. Id. §§ 3-10 to -17.
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former position, 54 and in response Professor Herbert Wechsler took the
latter.5 - They consequently reached different conclusions about whether
the Court was free to decline to decide matters properly brought before it
meeting the case-controversy requirement, Hand finding the Court could
decline decision56 and Wechsler finding it could not.57 Professor Alex-
ander Bickel sided wiih Hand, describing the Court's devices for nondeci-
sion as "passive virtues. 5 8 Professor Gerald Gunther sided with Wechsler 9
and others joined the fray.6 0 The modem "political question" doctrine,
which calls for exempting some issues from judicial review, 61 has received
special attention and has been denounced in strong terms.6 2 Professor
Louis Henkin has asserted that no such doctrine exists and has called for its
dismantling. 63 In his 1976 discussion, Henkin asserted that after the
broadest statements of the "political question" doctrine had been made by
Justice Frankfurter 64 and Justice Black,6 5 "judicial review... [had] had a
new birth, its character and content reformed, and its place established as
a hallmark of American political life, even a birthright of every inhabi-
tant. 6 6 Given Goldwater v. Carter, Henkin may have spoken too soon.
The Supreme Court plurality concluded that the issue in Goldwater
was a "political question" outside judicial review "because it involves the
authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations
and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate
54. L. HAND, supra note 34, at 10-11, 27-30.
55. Wechsler, supra note 34.
56. L. HAND, supra note 34, at 15. Even Hand, however, did not suggest the
power of review should be declined when the issue was whether "the statute or
order was outside the grant of power to the grantee." Id. at 66.
57. "[T]he only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from deci-
sion is that the constitution has committed the determination of the issue to
another agency of government than the courts." Wechsler, supra note 34, at 9.
Wechsler quoted these words of John Marshall: "'We have no more right to'
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution."' Id. at 10
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
58. A. BICKEL, supra note 47, at 111-98; Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term-Foreward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
59. Gunther, supra note 34.
60. See, e.g., ScharpfJudicialReview and the Political Question: A Func-
tionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966); Tigar, supra note 34.
61. See Henkin, supra note 38, at 598.
62. Tigar, supra note 34; Henkin, supra note 38.
63. Henkin, supra note 38. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
64. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552, 554-56 (1946) (minority opin-
ion).
65. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456-60 (1939) (Black, J., concurring).
66. Henkin, supra note 38, at 625.
[Vol. 46
11
Powell: Powell: Justiciability and Foreign Affairs
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
TREA TY TERMINA TION PO WER
the action of the President, '67 and reasoned by analogy6 to Coleman v.
Miller, 6 9 in which the issue raised also encountered constitutional silence.
In Coleman, the question presented was whether initial rejection by the
Kansas legislature of a federal constitutional amendment rendered inef-
fective a later vote to ratify the amendment. 70 The Court found the Consti-
tution spoke only of ratification, not of rejection, and declined to pass
upon the effect of the earlier rejection. 7' As Justice Powell pointed out,
however, Coleman was not apposite to Goldwater, since the real reason for
judicial abstention in Coleman was that deciding the issue there presented
would have involved the Court in regulating the procedure by which its
decisions are overruled.72 Additionally, in Coleman, as in almost all
"political question" cases, the Court actually did address and resolve what
Justice Brennan in Goldwater referred to as the "antecedent question
whether a particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the
repository of political decisionmaking power. '73 Coleman found that the
power to regulate the amendment process resided with Congress rather
than with the Court, and since Congress had imposed no limitations on
that process, none existed. 74
As originally developed, the "political question" doctrine involved a
requirement that the Court abstain from reviewing the decisions which it
found to be constitutionally committed to the political branch making
them, but required the Court to decide all other cases properly before it. 7
This has been described as the "classical" view of the doctrine76 and is
drawn from the dicta of Marbury and the decision in Luther v. Borden .77
Luther held that the question of which of two competing state govern-
ments was the constitutionally guaranteed republican form of government
was a question committed for resolution to Congress rather than to the
Court.7 8
67. 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 1002-03 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
69. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). A more apt analogy would have been the Presi-
dent's power to remove those executive officers whose appointment requires the
advice and consent of the Senate. See notes 175-79 and accompanying text infra.
70. 307 U.S. at 450.
71. Id.
72. 444 U.S. at 1001 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). See Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. at 435 n.1.
73. 444 U.S. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. See Henkin, supra note 38, at 613.
75. See generally Wechsler, supra note 34.
76. L. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 3-16, at 71 n.1. Tribe terms the other views
of the doctrine the "prudential" view (Bickel's; see A. BICKEL, supra note 47) and
the "functional" view (Scharpf's; see Scharpf, supra note 60).
77. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
78. Id. at 42. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912) (also holding that enforcement of the "guarantee clause" was committed
1981]
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In the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,7 9 the Supreme Court undertook a
review of the "political question" doctrine. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Brennan seemed to adhere to the "classical" view of the doctrine:
The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function
of the separation of powers. Much confusion results from the
capacity of the "political question" label to obscure the need for
case-by-case inquiry. Deciding whether a matter has in any meas-
ure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds what-
ever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court
as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.8 0
Justice Brennan distilled from the cases these principles:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the im-
possibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a politi-
cal decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
... The courts cannot reject as "no law suit" a bona fide con-
troversy as to whether some action denominated "political" ex-
ceeds constitutional authority.81
In the course of his review of the "political question" cases, Justice
Brennan discussed the application of the doctrine in the area of foreign af-
fairs, noting that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."82 In Goldwater,
however, the plurality's first reason for declining to address the separation
of powers question was that it involved foreign affairs.83 Both Justice
Powell"4 and Judge Gasch 5 carefully reviewed the principles identified in
exclusively to the political branches); Henkin, supra note 38, at 607-09. But see
Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937) (finding in the facts
presented no violation of the republican form of government requirement, but as
an alternative ground finding the issue nonjusticiable).
79. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
80. Id. at 210-11.
81. Id. at 217.
82. Id. at 211.
83. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
84. 444 U.S. at 998-1001 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. 481 F. Supp. at 956-58.
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Baker v. Carr and concluded from them that Goldwater did not present a
"political question." In concluding the case did present such a question,
the plurality neither cited nor discussed Baker v. Carr.
In asserting that there is no such thing as a "political question" doc-
trine, Henkin stated:
The cases which are supposed to have established the political
question doctrine required no... extra-ordinary abstention from
judicial review; they called only for the ordinary respect by the
courts for the political domain. Having reviewed, the Court re-
fused to invalidate the challenged actions because they were within
the constitutional authority of President or Congress. In no case
did the Court have to use the phrase "political question," and
when it did, it was using it in a different sense, saying in effect:
"We have reviewed your claims and we find that the action com-
plained of involves a political question, and is within the powers
granted by the Constitution to the political branches. The act
complained of violates no constitutional limitation on that power,
either because the Constitution imposes no relevant limitation, or
because the action is amply within the limits prescribed. We give
effect to what the political branches have done because they had
political authority under the Constitution to do it."86
Henkin found no case refusing to consider whether the President had
exceeded his constitutional authority.8 7 His theme, like Brennan's in
Baker v. Carr, was that the so-called "doctrine" was misleading.88 He
called for breaking it into its component parts, which he listed as:
1. -The courts are bound to accept decisions by the political
branches within their constitutional authority.
2. The courts will not find limitations or prohibitions on the
powers of the political branches where the Constitution does not
prescribe any.
3. Not all constitutional limitations or prohibitions imply
rights and standing to object in favor of private parties.
4. The courts may refuse some (or all) remedies for want of
equity.
5. In principle, finally, there might be constitutional provi-
sions which can properly be interpreted as wholly or in part "self-
monitoring" and not the subject of judicial review. (But the only
one the courts have found is the "guarantee clause" as applied to
challenges to state action, and even that interpretation was not in-
evitable.)8 9
86. Henkin, supra note 38, at 601.
87. Id. at 612.
88. "The 'political question' doctrine, I conclude, is an unnecessary, decep-
tive packaging of several established doctrines that has misled lawyers and courts
to find in it things that were never put there and make it far more than the sum of
its parts." Id. at 622.
89. Id. at 622-23.
19811
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss1/11
MISSOURILA WRE VIEW
Henkin emphasized that "these propositions do not include any basis for
refusing to consider . . . an allegation that the political branches have
acted unconstitutionally."9 0
The Court has repeatedly addressed claims that one branch of govern-
ment has invaded the proper sphere of another branch and on several
occasions has ruled such invasions unconstitutional. Thus, in Myers v.
United States,9' the Court declared unconstitutional statutes purporting
to require the President to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate
before removing officers who had been appointed with the Senate's advice
and consent. In The Steel Seizure Case,92 the Court ruled unconstitu-
tional, as an invasion of the legislative sphere, President Truman's seizure
of the nation's steel mills during the Korean War when a strike was immi-
nent. In United States v. Nixon, 93 the Court held that it, not the President,
had the final say about the President's claim of a constitutional executive
privilege and denied him the exercise of such a privilege under the facts
presented. The Court found an improper invasion of the judiciary's role in
the President's assertion that he could determine whether this "executive
privilege" could be invoked.9 4 In Buckley v. Valeo,99 the Court found that
Congress had infringed impermissibly on executive power by establishing
the Federal Election Commission because in so doing Congress had at-
tempted to vest in itself power to appoint officers of the United States and
to delegate to its own agency some enforcement powers, which powers of
appointment and enforcement were committed by the Constitution to the
Executive.9 6
The question, then, of who, as between the President and Congress,
has the constitutional power to terminate a treaty is a justiciable one within
established doctrine.97 Since this power necessarily resides somewhere
90. Id. at 623.
91. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)
(holding that Congress lacked constitutional authority to exclude Representative
Adam Clayton Powell); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) (holding that
congressional rules could not infringe the President's power by deviating from the
constitutional provision regarding "pocket vetoes").
92. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
93. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In the course of this unanimous decision, the Court
dealt with issues of justiciability. It declared that, in so doing, it should look
behind names which symbolize parties to determine whether a justiciable case or
controversy exists. Id. at 693. The Court found it had the power to pass upon the
President's claim of a constitutionally based executive privilege, id. at 703, and
was not deterred by the Constitution's silence on the issue, id. at 705.
94. Id. at 707.
95. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
96. Id. at 140-42.
97. Another Supreme Court tradition resembling the "political question"
doctrine, or perhaps an aspect of that doctrine, also limiting the Court's power of
judicial review, is that the Court will give effect to acts of the political branches
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within the federal government, locating it falls clearly within the Supreme
Court's well-established role of saying what the law is. In arguing other-
wise, the plurality in Goldwater either "profoundly misapprehends" the
Court's "political question" doctrine, as Justice Brennan asserted, 98 or at-
tempts to expand greatly that doctrine and restrict the Court's availability
as an arbiter in allocation of power questions. To the extent that the
"political question" doctrine is susceptible to such stretching, doing so is
ill-advised because, in Justice Powell's words, it raises the "spectre of the
Federal Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransi-
gence of the President and the Congress."9 9 If locating the treaty termina-
tion power is indeed a matter capable of being performed only through the
political processes, the Supreme Court may not act to banish the spectre.
Furthermore, the political weapons available to Congress in such a dispute
are unwieldy, and the President has a decided advantage. 100 Fortunately,
a majority of the Court did not say it was incapable of acting should this
spectre materialize.
IV. RIPENESS AND STANDING: THE CONGRESS' POWER TO SUE
Although ripeness and standing usually are treated as distinct ele-
ments of the constitutional justiciability doctrine, with ripeness focusing
within their constitutional power, even though they may violate international
law. See, e.g., Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Brown v. United
States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814), declaring such a power in the Presi-
dent. But see the dissent ofJustice Story in the same case. Id. at 153 (Story, J., dis-
senting). Thus, it long has been established that Congress may supersede a treaty
by passing an inconsistent statute, see The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,
600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888), although the
reasoning to this conclusion is infirm, see L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 163-64. In
Mitchell v. United States, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972
(1967), the defendant was denied the defense that his resistance to the Viet Nam
war was based upon the illegality of the war under international law. For a brief
discussion of similar Viet Nam war cases, see Henkin, supra note 38, at 623.
In Goldwater, however, no violation of international law was alleged. To the
contrary, international law supported the President's power to terminate the
Mutual Defense Treaty and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would have
so recognized. See S. REP. No. 96-119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1979); notes
206-19 and accompanying text infra.
The Supreme Court also has developed an approach similar to the "political
question" doctrine where religious questions are involved. See Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595 (1979); Constitutional Guidelinesfor Civil Court Resolution of Property
Disputes Arising from Religious Schism, 45 MO. L. REV. 518 (1980).
98. 444 U.S. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1001 (Powell, J., concurring).
100. See note 34 supra; notes 140 & 141 and accompanying text infra.
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on the status of the case' 0 1 and standing focusing on the status of the liti-
gants, 10 2 the issues often become intermingled. 0 3 Both ripeness and stand-
ing involve constitutional and prudential considerations. 104 In Goldwater,
101. See L. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 3-13. For recent judicial statements of
the ripeness doctrine, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81-82 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-18
(1976); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 136-49 (1974).
Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing. Id. at 140. Its goals are to avoid pre-
mature decision on constitutional issues when they are still hypothetical or specu-
lative and to delay decision until a better factual record is available. Id. at 143.
102. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); L. TRIBE, supra note 50, §§
3-17, -20, at 79-80, 90. For a recent statement by the Court of the standing doc-
trine, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 72-81 (1978). The Court summarized thus: "[A] litigant must demon-
strate . . .injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief re-
quested will prevent or redress the claimed injury to satisfy the 'case or contro-
versy' requirement of Art. III." Id. at 79. The district court in Goldwater used a
four-step analysis:
A legislator must satisfy the same basic requirements for standing as any
other litigant: (1) that he has suffered injury in fact; (2) that the interests
being asserted are within the zone of interests to be protected by the stat-
ute or constitutional guarantee in question; (3) that the injury is caused
by the challenged action; and (4) that the injury is capable of being re-
dressed by a favorable decision.
481 F. Supp. at 951 (citing Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204-05 n.68 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)). The second item in this list may not be necessary. See Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-80 (1978).
103. L. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 3-13, at 60 n.1. See Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978) (holding that
when the constitutional requirements of standing were met, so were those of ripe-
ness); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 117-18 (1976) (in a case where standing was
found, the Court acceded to congressional desire to obtain adjudication on con-
stitutionality over an arguably well-founded claim that the issues were unripe).
104. L. TRIBE, supra note 50, §§ 3-13, -17 to -18, at 60, 79-81. Both doc-
trines are grounded in the case-controversy requirement of article III of the Con-
stitution. Id. See note 51 supra.
The standing doctrine, like the "political question" doctrine, has been vigor-
ously criticized. In the context of a discussion of suits by legislators, one commen-
tator said:
Standing should not be treated as a separately articulated threshold
inquiry going to the basic jurisdiction of the federal courts. So treated, it
is an awkward and ill-used concept that is particularly inappropriate as a
mechanism for shaping and controlling judicial responses to the diffi-
cult, and frequently political, issues raised in legislators' suits. Standing
as an independently considered threshold obstacle should be eliminated
altogether, and should instead be considered only as part of the merits in
the context of the whole case for purposes of molding judicial remedies.
Note, Standing to Sue for Members of Congress, 83 YALE L.J. 1665, 1688 (1974).
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Justice Powell spoke in terms of ripeness while Chief Judge Wright had
spoken in terms of standing, but they both were addressing the same ques-
tion: 0 5 under what circumstances may Congressmen qua Congressmen
litigate a claim that the Executive has usurped congressional power?' 0 6
Justice Powell found the treaty termination power issue in Goldwater
unripe for three "prudential" reasons: (1) differences between the Presi-
dent and Congress are commonplace and usually turn on political rather
than legal considerations; (2) for the Court to decide the case would en-
courage small groups or individual Congressmen "to seek judicial resolu-
tion of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to
resolve the conflict"; and (3) Congress had taken no official action to con-
front the executive branch. 10 7 Chief Judge Wright had found a lack of
standing under prior cases involving legislators, reasoning that the plain-
tiffs suffered no "injury in fact" because Congress had suffered no injury
until its expressed will had been thwarted by the Executive. Finding Con-
gress had'not yet spoken unequivocally, Wright concluded the plaintiffs
could have suffered no derivative injury.1 0 8 The court of appeals majority,
by contrast, found standing by focusing on the specific claim made by the
plaintiffs, assuming it to be valid (as required by standing doctrine' 0 9 ), and
determining that "no conceivable senatorial action ...could likely pre-
vent termination of the Treaty."" 0 The plaintiffs were alleging that one-
third of the Senate plus one could prevent termination of the treaty,"' so
Tribe noted that threshold doctrines such as standing and ripeness are susceptible
to manipulation and are not treated with analytical rigor by the courts. L. TRIBE,
supra, § 3-13, at 60 n.1. Ripeness appears to partake heavily of prudential con-
cerns. See authorities cited note 103 supra.
105. Chief Judge Wright in a footnote recognized that the issue he called
"standing" could be cast as a "ripeness" issue. 617 F.2d at 716 n.25 (Wright, C.J.,
concurring). For commentaries on this general question, see Note, supra note 35;
Comment, Congressional Standing to Challenge Executive Action, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 1366 (1974); Note, supra note 104.
106. Although ripeness and standing developed as parts of the justiciability
doctrine and thus are usually thought of as defining the courts' power, they also
may be seen as defining the power of those who seek to litigate. One who has no
standing or whose case is found to be unripe lacks power to have it adjudicated.
This section attempts to focus on these elements of justiciability more from the
vantage point of Congress than from that of the Court.
107. 444 U.S. at 997-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
108. 617 F.2d at 712 (Wright, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Wright re-
viewed the career of Senate Resolution 15 and the Dole-Stone Amendment, but
did not consider the possible effect of the Taiwan Relations Act on the plaintiffs'
claim to standing. Id. at 712-15 (Wright, C.J., concurring). See notes 7-9 and ac-
companying text supra; notes 135 & 136 and accompanying text infra.
109. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
110. 617 F.2d at 703.
111. Id.
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the court of appeals majority found that to require even passage of a
resolution was to require an unnecessary, "useless" act in terms of standing
analysis. 112
The Supreme Court never has addressed the question of when a mem-
ber of Congress should be granted standing to sue. " 3 No case of Congress
v. President has been pursued in the Supreme Court, and it is unclear
whether such a case would be heard." 4 Most of the law in this area has
been developed in the District of Columbia Circuit. " 5 The leading case is
Kennedy v. Sampson," 6 in which Senator Edward Kennedy was granted
standing to challenge a purported "pocket veto" by President Nixon when
Congress had recessed rather than adjourned. Standing was granted on
the theory that, if the "veto" were unconstitutional, Kennedy's vote for
passage of the statute had been nullified improperly. The court specifi-
cally ruled that under the standing doctrine the congressional litigant
needed only to be among the injured, not be the only one injured, and
therefore it was not necessary for Congress as a body or representatives
designated by Congress to bring the suit, nor was it necessary under the cir-
cumstances for Senator Kennedy to await some further action by Con-
gress. 117
The court of appeals majority in Goldwater read Kennedy and other
cases as allowing standing for congressional litigants asserting as an injury
112. Id.
113. Henkin, supra note 8, at 648-49. The only case in which the Supreme
Court has extended standing to sue to legislators suing qua legislators is Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). In Coleman, a group of Kansas legislators was
given standing to contest the method of ratification of a constitutional amend-
ment because they had a "plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the
effectiveness of their votes." Id. at 438. Nevertheless, the Court held the issue to
be a nonjusticiable political question, so the legislators were denied power to liti-
gate the issue anyway. See notes 68-72 and accompanying text supra.
114. Henkin says such a case probably would fail because Congress' interest is
political, not "personal." Henkin, supra note 8, at 648. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, stated in 1976: "It is clear that
the House as a whole has standing to assert its investigatory power, and can desig-
nate a member to act on its behalf." United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430,
435 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Note, supra note 35, at 1632 n.5.
115. See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
907 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. Na-
tional Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kennedy v. Sampson,
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 106 (D.D.C. 1973); note 114 supra. See also
Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Brown v. Ruckels-
haus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 264 (C.D. Cal. 1973); note 97 supra.
116. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
117. Id. at 435-36.
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the loss of a right to vote in the future. " 8 Chief Judge Wright argued that
only nullification of a past vote should suffice for standing" 9 and asserted
that any injury suffered by plaintiffs was inflicted not by the President, but
by their colleagues' failure to take additional steps to confront the Presi-
dent. 20 In conformity with the majority's position, it has been asserted
that only in the pre-enactment stage of legislation do congressional plain-
tiffs have a better argument for standing than do ordinary citizens.' 2' A
distinction has been drawn between those suits by Congressmen seeking to
enforce only their personal, private rights 22 and those where they seek to
enforce rights derived from their status as Congressmen, called derivative
or participatory suits. ' 23
Participatory suits by Congressmen present special problems. Besides
those mentioned by Justice Powell, 2 4 other concerns are that such suits
would cut off political debate prematurely and would subject the courts to
manipulation for partisan purposes. 25 For these reasons it has been
recommended that such suits which are not authorized by Congress be
found nonjusticiable. 126 Where Congress has authorized a suit, however,
none of these reasons for the courts to abstain is present. 2 7 Presumably,
Congress would authorize a suit only for noncommonplace "legal"
issues; 128 if so, no encouragement would be given to suits by small groups of
Congressmen; 2 9 Congress would have chosen a method for confronting
the President; 30 political debate would have run its course;13 ' and the
danger of partisan politics corrupting the courts would be lessened."32
118. "To be cognizable for standing purposes, the alleged diminution in con-
gressional influence must amount to a disenfranchisement, a complete nullifica-
tion or withdrawal of a voting opportunity ...." 617 F.2d at 702.
119. Id. at 712 n.5 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
120. Id. at 712 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
121. See Note, supra note 35, at 1639-40.
122. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7-8, 12 (1976); Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); cases cited note 91 supra.
123. See Note, supra note 35, at 1634; cases cited note 115 supra. Cf. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
"Hohfeldian" (personal, proprietary, traditional) plaintiffs from "non-
Hohfeldian" (public, representative) plaintiffs).
124. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
125. Note, supra note 35, at 1649-50.
126. Id. at 1655.
127. Id. at 1647-48. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d
384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
128. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
130. See text accompanying note 107 supra. "[T]he wiser course would be for
the courts to defer to the collective judgment of Congress as to the choice of
remedy." Note, supra note 35, at 1648.
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In Goldwater, Judge Gasch found specifically that Congress had given
no indication it disapproved of the suit. 133 In fact, he accepted the argu-
ment that the preliminary vote on Senate Resolution 15 and the Dole-
Stone Amendment were endorsements of the view presented by the plain-
tiffs. 1-3 4 Furthermore, the plain wording of the Taiwan Relations Act seems
to be at least an authorization to proceed with the suit, if not a confronta-
tion with the President. 135 Neither the majority in the court of appeals, nor
Chief Judge Wright, nor Justice Powell dealt with the possibility that this
Act was sufficient to grant standing to the plaintiffs, although Chief Judge
Wright acknowledged that such authorizations by Congress theoretically
were a "possible basis of standing."' 36 Rather, all three views emphasized a
need for some extreme occurrence before the courts should consent to hear
the case. The court of appeals majority spoke of a "complete disenfran-
chisement,"' 37 and found such. Chief Judge Wright required a finding
that the Executive had "thwarted the will" of Congress, 138 and did not find
such. Justice Powell spoke of Court action only if the government were
"brought to a halt" by a confrontation,139 and, of course, this had not
occurred.
Such requirements of cataclysm are inappropriate. As one commen-
tator has observed:
Even if the Congress were to act .... the only remedies available to
it would be to cut off funds . . . or to initiate impeachment pro-
ceedings.... The disruption of government services and functions
entailed by such actions would be so severe, the remedy so drastic
in proportion to the injury, as to preclude resort to such solutions
in all but the most egregious cases. 140
As to the consequences of such requirements when an important issue of
the scope of presidential power is involved, Professor Tigar stated:
A refusal to decide in such a case, or a delay which obviates the
133. 481 F. Supp. at 955. Compare the discussion of Kennedy v. Sampson in
Note, supra note 35, at 1650-51.
134. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that this
is in the nature of a factual determination, which ordinarily would be beyond the
review of appellate courts unless "clearly erroneous." See Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 n.19 (1978).
135. For a portion of the text of the Act, see note 9 supra. Apparently, how-
ever, the defendants had argued passage of this Act indicated congressional ap-
proval rather than disapproval of the President's action. This argument was re-
jected by Judge Gasch. 481 F. Supp. at 954 n.18.
136. 617 F.2d at 712 n.6 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
137. Id. at 702 (majority opinion).
138. Id. at 712 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
139. 444 U.S. at 1001 (Powell, J., concurring).
140. Note, supra note 35, at 1648. Congress shared these concerns in Gold-
water. See notes 194-97 and accompanying text infra.
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need to decide, suggests to the alleged offender that the chal-
lenged exercise of power is worth the risk again since there is no
practical restraint upon it. 141
Although the core issue irvboth the ripeness and the standing analyses
performed in Goldwater appeared to be the existence of an injury in fact to
the plaintiffs, 142 in previous appropriate cases even this requirement has
been softened by the Court. Thus, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Entiron-
mental Study Group, Inc., 143 very attenuated reasoning was necessary to
find an injury to the plaintiffs. 144 Requiring a more concrete injury in that
case would have prevented the claims from being litigated until a nuclear
reactor had exploded. 45 In Buckley v. Valeo ,146 full adjudication of the
issues was allowed in the interest of preventing multiple suits. 47 Both of
these cases should have weighed in favor of reaching a decision on the
merits in Goldwater. Requiring a large political explosion before consent-
ing to hear a case operates to deny an opportunity to litigate just as effec-
tively as does the "political question" doctrine, and in this case, in effect,
gives the power to the President anyway, 4 8 while keeping everyone unsure
about whether he has the power. 14 9 An additional consideration is that
such gaping holes in the Constitution as the one at issue in Goldwater are
unlikely to be discovered often, and when they are, the political branches,
rather than private persons, would be more, not less, appropriate parties
to bring the suit, being the real parties in interest. 5 0 It is clear that if a
private person were injured by the President's termination of a treaty, the
141. Tigar, supra note 34, at 1148-49 (speaking of The Steel Seizure Case,
343 U.S. 579 (1952)). See also note 34 supra.
142. Judge Gasch found this was the only element of standing in dispute. 481
F. Supp. at 955-56.
143. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
144. In a separate opinion in Duke Power, Justice Stevens remarked: "The
string of contingencies that supposedly holds this litigation together is too delicate
for me." Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring). He would have found neither ripe-
ness nor standing in that case. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 78 n.23 (majority opinion).
146. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
147. Id. at 113-18. The Court in so doing also acceded to a congressional
desire to obtain adjudication on as many issues as possible. Id. at 117.
148. See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra; note 34 supra; notes 140 &
141 and accompanying text supra.
149. Such a result runs counter to the concerns expressed in the "political
question" cases that the Court should avoid "multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962),
and that the Court should yield when there is an "unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made," id. For the context of these
quotations, see text accompanying note 81 supra.
150. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 648.
1981]
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss1/11
MISSOURILA WRE VIEW
private person could litigate the separation of powers issue. 15' Requiring
more of Congress is anomalous. 152 Even leaving aside the factual disputes
about whether Congress had either authorized the suit or adequately con-
fronted the President, there are strong prudential reasons the Court
should have reached the merits in Goldwater.
In most congressional suits which seek adjudication of separation of
power questions, it would be appropriate to require some formal approval
of the suit by Congress. It is arguable that such approval was given in Gold-
water. Requiring a cataclysmic confrontation is inappropriate, even as a
general rule. Where, as in Goldwater, the claim presented is that a minor-
ity of one house has certain rights, requiring even majority approval of the
suit before it can be heard is inappropriate, as the court of appeals found.
To the extent ripeness and standing are based on prudential concerns, fac-
tors present in Goldwater weighed in favor of a finding that these prelimi-
nary requirements were met.
V. DOMESTIC ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: THE PRESIDENT'S POWER
The merits question in Goldwater, whether the President acting alone
had the power to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty, upon which the
Supreme Court did not rule and the lower courts reached opposite conclu-
sions, 153 has both a domestic constitutional component and an interna-
tional component. Had he chosen to present the international argument,
the President likely would have cast it in terms of another branch of justici-
ability doctrine: "mootness.' '15 4 Probably for political reasons, however,
this argument was not pursued by the President, 155 although it was raised
in an amicus brief before the court of appeals, 156 which declined to address
it.'17 Both domestic and international law regarding allocation of treaty
termination power will be discussed briefly here, and an effort will be
made to separate them.
Although the domestic allocation of foreign affairs powers is a complex
matter, 158 most scholars agree that the President has the power to termi-
151. See The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926); Henkin, supra note 8, at 648.
152. Note, supra note 35, at 1646.
153. See notes 16-24 and accompanying text supra.
154. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 647 n.6.
155. Id. See also Scheffer, supra note 3, at 937-44.
156. Brief for Amici Curiae, International Law Institute of the Georgetown
University Law Center et al., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Georgetown Brief].
157. 617 F.2d at 699 n.2.
158. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 3-123.
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nate treaties. 159 A variety of statements on this issue has been made
throughout the nation's history, and a variety of actions taken, with
prestigious men taking opposing sides. 1
6 0
The proper textual interpretation of the Constitution's separate provi-
sions granting power to Congress and to the President has been the subject
of debate from shortly after the Constitution was adopted until the pres-
ent. Article I gives to Congress "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted,''
6 1
while article II states that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent of the United States of America."'' 62 Alexander Hamilton read these
words to mean the grant of power to the legislative department was limited
to those areas listed in article I, while the Executive was given all "execu-
tive" power, the list in article II being merely examples. 63 This construc-
tion was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1926 in Myers v. United
States,164 in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, but failed to win endorse-
ment in 1952 in The Steel Seizure Case. ' 5 The court of appeals majority in
Goldwater adhered to Hamilton's argument, without attributing it to
him. 166 Under this reading of the Constitution, power to terminate treaties
would inhere in the Executive because this power is not among those given
to the Congress.16
7
Another inquiry made by the Supreme Court in determining to which
branch of government power is allocated is whether the challenged power
relates to external or to domestic affairs. In United States v. Curtiss-
159. Henkin, supra note 8, at 651. See also Nelson, supra note 34, at 890,
906. But see Riggs, Termination of Treaties by the Executive Without Congres-
sionalApproval, 32J. AIR L. & COM. 526, 533-34 (1966); Scheffer, supra note 3,
at 966-67, 977-1005; Presidential Amendment and Termination of Treaties: The
Case of the Warsaw Convention, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 580 (1967).
160. For a brief summary, see L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 417-19.
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
162. Id. art. II, § 1.
163. 7 A. HAMILTON, WORKS 76, 81 (Hamilton ed. 1851).
164. 272 U.S. 52, 116, 118 (1926). But see id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting);
id. at 178-239 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 240-95 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
165. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). This argument was rejected in the opinion of the
Court by Justice Black, id. at 587, in the separate opinion of Justice Douglas, id.
at 632, and in the separate opinion of Justice Jackson, id. at 640-41. Three Jus-
tices in dissent subscribed to Hamilton's view. Id. at 681-82 (Vinson, C.J., dissent-
ing).
166. 617 F.2d at 704-05. "We note ... that the powers conferred upon Con-
gress in Article I of the Constitution are specific, detailed, and limited, while the
powers conferred upon the President by Article II are generalized in a manner
that bespeaks no such limitation upon foreign affairs powers." Id. at 704.
167. Also apparently unaware of the history of this view, the plaintiffs in
Goldwater claimed it was "an unprecedented feat of construction." Petitioners'
Petition for Certiorari at 17.
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Wright Export Corp. ,168 the Court, with only one dissent,1 69 identified
sovereignty as an extra-constitutional source of federal power in the area of
external affairs.170 Regarding allocation of this power, Justice Sutherland
for the Court said:
Not only.., is the Federal power over external affairs in origin
and essential character different from that over internal affairs,
but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly
limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, compli-
cated, delicate, and manifold problems, the President alone has
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. 1
71
Justice Sutherland referred to the President's authority to act in this area as
"the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole organ of the
Federal government in the field of international relations - a power which
does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress."'172 This
analysis, like that of Hamilton, would lodge in the President those powers
inherent in sovereignty which are not otherwise distributed. 7 3 Thus, this
analysis would also result in a finding that the power to terminate treaties
belongs with the executive branch. 174
A close analogy may be made to another clause of the Constitution.
Just as article II, section 2 gives the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, power to make treaties, but does not provide for their ter-
mination, the immediately following clause of the same section gives him,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, power to appoint "Officers of
the United States," but does not provide for their removal. 7 5 In Myers, 176
Chief Justice Taft found the dicta in Marbury'7 7 unpersuasive and con-
cluded that the power to remove executive officers is vested in the Presi-
dent and is not subject to regulation by Congress.' 78 If this analogy is
168. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
169. The dissent by Justice McReynolds was one sentence. Id. at 333
(McReynolds, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 315-16.
171. Id. at 319.
172. Id. at 320.
173. L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 43.
174. Justice Sutherland's statements in Curtiss- Wright have been widely criti-
cized, but the opinion remains authoritative doctrine. See id. at 19-27. See also
617 F.2d at 734-36 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting).
175. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
176. See note 164 and accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 44-49 and accompanying text supra.
178. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). This holdingwas modi-
fied later so as not to apply to an appointee who was not a purely "executive" offi-
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apt, 119 Myers is authority for the proposition that the President alone may
terminate treaties.
The grant of the treaty power itself has provided an argument in favor
of presidential power to terminate treaties. The court of appeals argued
that because the grant of power appears in the executive article (article II)
rather than the legislative article (article I) of the Constitution, and
because it is the President who makes treaties and he remains free to refuse
to ratify the treaty even after obtaining the Senate's consent, 8 0 the treaty
termination power is outside the legislative sphere.' 8
Since John Marshall first described the President as "sole organ of the
nation in its external relations,"'8 12 that phrase has come to designate, if
not create, broad substantive powers possessed by the President. 183 Thus,
without the approval of the Senate, he may hire agents for negotiating
with foreign countries; 18 4 he alone communicates with foreign countries
and Congress is barred from doing so; 185 he has the power to conclude "ex-
ecutive agreements" without Senate or congressional approval;8 6 he has
the power to interpret, implement, and react to the violation of treaties; 87
179. In Goldwater, the court of appeals relied on this analogy, 617 F.2d at
703, while Judge MacKinnon, id. at 737-38, and Judge Gasch, 481 F. Supp. at
960, rejected it, concluding that the respective powers were fundamentally dif-
ferent. Judge MacKinnon was harsh. He referred to the analogy as "absurd." 617
F.2d at 738 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting).
The appointment clause retains vitality as a source of presidential power. See
discussion of Buckley v. Valeo in text accompanying note 95 supra.
It has been suggested that, as a result of President Carter's action in ter-
minating the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Senate may routinely attach conditions
to their advice and consent, requiring consultation before termination. Brief for
Amici Curiae, Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman at 6, Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Just such a condition to an appointment was what
was ruled unconstitutional in Myers.
180. See L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 130, 136.
181. 617 F.2d at 705.
182. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800).
183. E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936). See L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 45, 300 n.18.
184. L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 46.
185. Id. at 45, 47.
186. Id. at 176-84. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31
(1937). It would be possible for a President to vitiate a requirement that he obtain
congressional or Senate consent before terminating a treaty by concluding more
agreements as executive agreements. Scheffer, supra note 3, at 1007 n.280. Such
agreements already cover the same subject matter and are employed to ac-
complish the identical purposes for which treaties are used. II B. SCHWARTZ, A
COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: THE POWERS OF
GOVERNMENT 150 (1963). And they clearly may be terminated by the President
acting alone. See note 34 supra.
187. L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 167-71.
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and he has the power to recognize and withdraw recognition from foreign
governments. 8 Other constitutional sources of presidential foreign affairs
power include his designation as Commander-in-Chief8 9 and his obliga-
tion to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."'9 0 The President
also possesses a wide range of other foreign affairs powers,' 9' and although
the total conglomeration of his powers is of less-than-certain constitutional
derivation, its existence is clear. 9 2 The nature of the office of President as
it has evolved, therefore, provides a strong argument that treaty termina-
tion power resides there. 93 Indeed, the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee did not question the effectiveness of President Carter's notice of ter-
mination, but sought only to influence future actions,19 4 and dispute
about whether Senate Resolution 15 would apply to the Mutual Defense
Treaty is what prevented that resolution's adoption. 95 The presence of
article X in the Mutual Defense Treaty, empowering the United States to
terminate the treaty, 96 coupled with the President's broad powers as "sole
organ," may be seen as sufficient to give him effective power to terminate
this particular treaty. 97
188. Id. at 93. Justice Brennan felt this single power was sufficient to support
the President's action of terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty. 444 U.S. at
1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at
50-54.
190. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at
54-56. Rather than a source of presidential power, this clause, in combination
with the "supreme law" clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, see note 12 supra, was
claimed by the plaintiffs in Goldwater to be a restraint on presidential power.
Brief for Appellees at 43-47, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (1979). Their
argument was accepted by Judge MacKinnon. 617 F.2d at 736 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring and dissenting). This argument, according to Henkin, plays with
words. He terms it "ludicrous" and points out that "termination of a treaty by the
President is not 'repeal' of a 'law'; it is an international act terminating an inter-
national legal obligation of the United States." Henkin, supra note 8, at 653.
191. See L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 48-49, 56-65.
192. Id. at 44.
193. Henkin, supra note 8, at 651-52.
194. S. REP. No. 96-119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979). "It would have
been easy for the Committee ... to report a resolution matching the Executive's
assertion of power with equally sweeping claims by the Senate. But it seemed to
the Committee undesirable to precipitate a constitutional shouting match." Id.
at 6.
195. See note 8 supra.
196. For the text of article X, see note 13 supra.
197. In the list of factors found persuasive by the court of appeals, the ex-
istence of article X in the treaty was said to be "of central significance." 617 F.2d
at 708. Besides the factors discussed in the text in this section, the court of appeals
also used an analysis of the nature of treaties, id. at 705, and practical considera-
tions that if the claim of the plaintiffs were granted, the President's effectiveness
would be severely curtailed, id. at 705-06.
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Arguments for congressional power are harder to make.198 In a brief
amici curiae, it was asserted that treaty termination is not a single act but a
sequence of acts, and that for each act constitutional practice had estab-
lished "different configurations of competence."1 99 The details of this
theory were not elucidated, however. It has been argued that, contrary to
the above, in foreign affairs and elsewhere, the President is "only the ex-
ecutive agent of Congress." 20 0 The plaintiffs in Goldwater relied primarily
on their argument that if the President lacks power to enter a treaty, so
should he lack power to terminate one. 20 1 Although this argument was re-
jected as "sterile symmetry" by the court of appeals, it was founded on emi-
nent dicta.2 02 The plaintiffs also relied on their analysis of historical prac-
tice in treaty termination, but they read history differently than did the
defendants, and both lower courts found past practice to be
inconclusive. 203
Perhaps the greatest weakness in the plaintiffs' case in Goldwater was
in the formulation of their claim. The Senate resolution they invoked
made a distinction, on no apparent constitutional grounds, between
mutual defense treaties and other treaties. 20 4 Also, the plaintiffs claimed
the anomalous right for a minority of the Senate to keep the nation com-
mitted to a treaty, even if the President and a majority of the Senate wished
it terminated. 20 5
The United States is bound by international law. In The Paquette
Habana, the Supreme Court said, "International law is a part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts . . .as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determi-
nation." 20 6 The courts, however, will not entertain allegations that a par-
ticular branch of the federal government has acted outside international
law. 20 7 Because no such claim was presented in Goldwater, the quoted
general rule is applicable.
198. Henkin, supra note 8, at 652.
199. Brief for Amici Curiae, Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman at
3, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
200. See L. HENKIN, supra note 34, at 81-84.
201. See 617 F.2d at 703.
202. See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 8 (1821) (Story, J.);
Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 243, 128 N.E. 185, 192 (Cardozo, J.), cert.
denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920).
203. See 617 F.2d at 706. See also note 35 supra. The plaintiffs also presented
an argument based on the treaty being "the supreme Law of the Land." See note
190 supra.
204. See 617 F.2d at 707; S. REP. NO. 96-119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8
(1979); Henkin, supra note 8, at 652.
205. See 617 F.2d at 703, 705-06; Henkin, supra note 8, at 653.
206. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
207. See note 97 supra.
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 20 8 which is not yet in
force as a treaty, nevertheless has been recognized by the International
Court of Justice 20 9 and by courts of the United States as an accurate state-
ment of customary international law. 210 It was so recognized by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in its report on Senate Resolution 15,211 and
was used as the basis for that committee's recommendation of the grounds
upon which the President validly could terminate a treaty. 212 The careful
208. Opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27
(1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna
Convention].
209. Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, [1974] I.C.J. 175, [1973] I.C.J. 3; Appeal
Relating to theJurisdiction of the ICAO Council, [1972] I.C.J. 46.
210. Day v. Trans World Airlines, In_., 528 F.2d 31, 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1261
(5th Cir. 1978).
211. S. REP. No. 96-119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1979).
212. To summarize the provisions of. . . [the Vienna Convention], a
state has the right to terminate treaties under one or more of the follow-
ing circumstances:
(1) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty;
(2) by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other con-
tracting states;
(3) where it is established that the parties intended to admit the
possibility of denunciation or withdrawal;
(4) where a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by
the nature of the treaty;
(5) where it appears from a later treaty concluded with the same par-
ty and relating to the same subject matter that the matter should be
governed by that treaty;
(6) where the provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible
with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being
applied at the same time;
(7) where there has been a material breach by another party;
(8) where the treaty has become impossible to perform;
(9) where there has been a fundamental change of circumstances;
(10) where there has been a severance of diplomatic or consular rela-
tions and such relations are indispensable for the application of the
treaty;
(11) where a new peremptory norm of international law emerges
which is in conflict with the treaty;
(12) where an error was made regarding a fact or situation which
was assumed by that state to exist at the time when the treaty was con-
cluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound;
(13) where a state has been induced to conclude a treaty by the
fraudulent conduct of another state; and
(14) where a state's consent to be bound has been procured by the
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draftsmen of the Convention included provisions identifying both who has
power to conclude a treaty21 3 and who has power to terminate a treaty.214
The latter provision states in part:
Any act ... terminating... a treaty pursuant to the provisions of
the treaty . . . shall be carried out through an instrument com-
municated to the other parties. If the instrument is not signed by
the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the representative of the State communicating it may be
called upon to produce full powers. 21 5
The instrument communicating the United States' notice of termination
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed by Warren Christopher
as Acting Secretary of State. 216
Under international law, therefore, the binding force of the Mutual
Defense Treaty was at an end. 217 Seeking to maintain it in force was an
effort to preserve a nontreaty with a nongovernment. 2 8 If indeed interna-
tional law is a part of our law, the Vienna Convention presents the interest-
ing phenomenon of international law operating to influence the domestic
allocation of power among the branches of our government. 21 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of who may terminate treaties presented by Goldwater v.
Carter was uniquely suited for resolution by the institution which our
Supreme Court has become. The Court's failure to answer the question
represents a retreat from the Court's historic role as expounder of the law,
deepens the morass of justiciability law, effectively forecloses reasoned
resolution of the specific substantive issue, and misses an opportunity to
bring our domestic law in line with that of the community of nations.
213. Vienna Convention, supra note 208, art. 7.
214. Id. art. 67, para. 2.
215. Id.
216. Telephone interview with Mary Brandt, Office of the Assistant Legal
Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State (Sept. 26, 1980).
217. See Vienna Convention, supra note 208, art. 70. It is also possible to
argue, as did a brief submitted by amici to the court of appeals, that under article
63 of the Vienna Convention the treaty was already dead because of events pre-
ceding the notice of termination, especially the change in recognition from the
Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. Georgetown Brief, supra
note 156, at 9-14. See also Henkin, supra note 8, at 647-48 n.6. Administration
officials, however, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
they considered the treaty binding until January 1, 1980. Petitioners' Petition for
Certiorari at 28-29.
218. Henkin, supra note 8, at 647 n.6, 654.
219. Other novel aspects of the relationship between the United States and
the "two Chinas" are discussed in Scheffer, supra note 3, at 944-66.
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If a President again acts to terminate a treaty without consulting Con-
gress, and Congress wishes to have the issue decided in an orderly fashion,
Congress should vote to authorize a suit. The courts should not insist on
some counterproductive confrontation, but should allow the authorization
of Congress to suffice for a finding of justiciability. The courts also should
conclude that the President has the power to terminate treaties, under
both domestic law and international law.
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